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Abstract 
The purpose of this study is to introduce the board of directors as a signal of firm quality to abate information 
asymmetry. This study is based on agency theory and signaling theory to suggest that the existence of properly 
structured board at the time of the IPO may signal high firm quality to potential investors. To do that, I examine 
the association between board of directors' characteristics (including board composition, board size, leadership 
structure (CEO duality) and existence of an audit committee) and underpricing of 133 Initial Public Offerings 
(IPOs) in France between 2000 and 2004.  Empirical evidence suggests that there is a positive effect of board 
size on underpricing and a negative association between the proportion of independent directors and 
underpricing. However, CEO duality as well as existence of an audit committee have no significant impact on 
underpricing. Overall, these results are consistent with the assumption that board attributes may be used as a 
signal of firm quality. 
Key words: Board of directors, Signaling theory, Agency theory, Initial Public Offerings, Underpricing 
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1. INTRODUCTION 
At the time of an initial public offering (IPO), the entrepreneur seeking financing has 
typically private information about the future prospect of the firm, while potential investors 
have little information about it. The entrepreneur must use a suitable mechanism to overcome 
this information asymmetry; otherwise, he will give rise to the adverse selection problem 
described in Akerlof (1970): investors will value all IPOs at the average value. As a result, 
entrepreneurs with firm values higher than the average will withdraw from the market and the 
average of the remaining firms seeking financing will fall. This process will continue until the 
entrepreneur of the lowest firm value is the only one remaining in the market. To avoid 
adverse selection problem, the signaling perspective suggests that entrepreneurs of higher 
valued firms are, therefore, motivated to find a mechanism to communicate credibly their 
private information to potential investors.    
Extant research has widely applied signaling theory to address this information asymmetry 
dilemma. Signaling theory suggests that certain indicators provide signals to potential 
investors about the capabilities of the IPO firm and therefore the likely future value of the 
firm. Research reports that credible communication outlining important information at the 
time of an IPO can reduce the information asymmetry between IPO issuers and investors. The 
basic idea of these studies is that due to the newness of the firm to the equity market and the 
absence of alternative sources of information, the valuation of initial public offerings by 
potential investors will mainly depend on the net assets of the business and the earnings and 
cash flows generated from those assets. The prospectus, inviting the public to subscribe to the 
issue, contains information on the assets, historical profitability, economic prospects, and 
investment plans. In order to add credibility to these basic valuation parameters, entrepreneurs 
will adopt strategies and disclose data that signal their private knowledge about the firm. The 
success of the signaling strategy chosen by the entrepreneur depends very much on the 
credibility of the information communicated, as perceived by investors.    
The first models focus on the role played by the firm financing policy (ownership retained, 
debt, dividend policy) and by underpricing as a signal of firm quality. Then, as an extension 
of these signaling mechanisms, the role of third parties in mitigating information asymmetry 
between entrepreneurs and potential investors at the time of an IPO has been well documented 
in the accounting and finance literature. The formal certification hypothesis first presented in 
Booth and Smith (1986) subsequently led to the development of several models. A related 
body of empirical work has examined how investment bankers/underwriters (Beatty and 
Ritter, 1986; Carter and Manaster, 1990) auditors (Beatty, 1989; Michaely and Shaw, 1995) 
and venture capitalists (Megginson and Weiss, 1991) help resolve the information asymmetry 
inherent in the initial public offering (IPO) process.  
The growing interest in corporate governance was stimulated by the startling evidence of the 
failure of some famous companies over recent history. Early examples include Rolls Royce in 
Britain and the Bond Corp in Australia. More recently, the collapse of HIH insurance and 
Ansett Australia airline in Australia, and Enron in the USA have refocused attention on this 
issue. The impact of these business events force a radical reassessment of how companies are 
directed. It is widely accepted that good corporate governance systems are associated with 
better corporate value, and is also a key element in corporate competitiveness and access to 
capital (Jensen and Meckling, 1979; Shleifer and Vishny, 1997). A well-functioning corporate 
governance structure can not only protect shareholder's investment, but also motivate those 
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entrepreneurs to maximize the wealth of investors (Charreaux, 1997; Hung, 1998). Sanders 
and Boivie (2004) suggest that corporate governance parameters can serve as useful screening 
and sorting criteria that influence investors' valuations of the IPO firm when primary 
information sources are limited or obscure. The board of directors is one of a number of 
internal corporate governance mechanisms that are intended to ensure that the interests of 
shareholders and managers are closely aligned (Shleifer and Vishny, 1997; Hung, 1998). The 
board of directors, which represents one of these mechanisms, ensures that the information 
communicated before the issue is credible. A properly structured board can then have a 
certifying effect on firm value, similar to the certification effect of underwriters, auditors, or 
venture capitalists. In other words, high quality boards of directors can convey the intrinsic 
value of the firm (certify the firm's value) more credibly to potential investors, thus reducing 
the information asymmetry facing the issuing firm, resulting in lower under pricing in the 
IPOs of these firms. However, the relationship between the quality of board of directors and 
under pricing has so far received little attention in the literature. The objective of this essay is 
to remedy this gap in the literature.  
The purpose of this study is to introduce the board of directors as a signal of firm quality. To 
do that, I empirically examine the association between board attributes and underpricing. I 
hypothesize that the board attributes advocated by the agency theory can minimize the extent 
of underpricing at initial public offering (IPO) by certifying the quality of financial disclosure 
contained in the prospectuses and thereby reducing the level of ex ante uncertainty and 
mitigating information asymmetry. This conjecture is based on signalling theory, which 
suggests that firms send signals to reduce information asymmetry.  
To do that, I empirically examine the relationship between board of directors' attributes (board 
independence, board size, and board leadership structure) and under pricing for 133 Initial 
Public Offerings (IPOs) in France between 2000 and 2004. In this study, I choose France as 
the research setting, a less developed IPO market compared with that in UK and US (Chahine 
et al., 2007), which can add insights to the understanding of signaling mechanisms, especially 
in an environment outside of the United States. Furthermore, I choose the French IPO firms as 
the sample in this study because the information asymmetry and the agency conflict are 
especially severe in France because of its poor legal investor protection (La Porta et al., 
1999). In addition, France is a country characterized by concentrated ownership and large 
private benefits of control (Roosenboom and Schramade, 2006). In particular, Fanto (1998) 
documents that French managers have a responsibility to serve social interest rather than 
shareholder interest. Alcouffe (2000) argues that this principle of social interest increases 
managerial discretion and encourages the owner-manager to pursue his own interests, usually 
at the expense of minority shareholders.   
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. The next section presents the relevant 
literature as well as our research hypotheses. The third section explains the research design 
and methodology employed to test the research hypotheses while the fourth presents and 
discuss the empirical findings. The final section provides the concluding comments.  
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2. LITERATURE REVIEW AND HYPOTHESES  
Rock (1986) and Beatty and Ritter (1986) explain the under pricing phenomenon by the 
existence of information asymmetry between informed and non-informed investors. 
According to Rock (1986)'s model, there are two classes of investors: informed and non-
informed investors. Both informed investors class and on-informed investors class are 
assumed to exist in the IPO market. The informed investors, having learned the true firm 
value through costly information search activities, will only subscribe to issuers that they 
know to be under priced, whereas the non-informed investors will subscribe to all issues 
based on the information they possess. As a result, the non-informed investors face a winner's 
curse: if a non-informed investor is allocated shares in an IPO, there is greater than usual 
chance that the offering will start trading at a discount. In other words, for a non-informed 
investor, the expected return conditional upon being allocated shares is less than his expected 
return conditional upon submitting a purchase order. But an informed investor will participate 
in the market only if the expected return, conditional upon being allocated shares, is non-
negative. Therefore, in order to secure the non-informed investors' participation (without 
which the market for IPOs will fail) issuers must then under price their shares to ensure that 
non-informed investors' expected return conditional upon being allocated shares is non-
negative. By using a sample IPO data set from 1977 to 1982, Beatty and Ritter (1986) find 
evidence that the ex ante uncertainty about the offer price of an issuing firm is positively 
related to its expected under pricing.          
In this context of information asymmetry, the presence of a properly structured board of 
directors may reduce the level of underpricing that IPO firms have to maintain to attract this 
category of investors. The presence of an effective board of directors is indeed likely to 
reduce the probability of errors or irregularities in the firm’s financial statements. The 
information contained in firm’s financial reports is then more precise and credible for firms 
possessing an effective board. Because of this, the non-informed investors are in a position to 
estimate more precisely the distribution of the firm value, thereby reducing the level of ex-
ante uncertainty. 
The effectiveness of board of directors depends mainly on board structure. Specifically, board 
size, the proportion of independent directors on the boards, the separation of CEO/chairman 
positions (Zahra and Pearce, 1989; Johnson et al., 1996) as well as the existence of au audit 
committee have been used as indicators of board effectiveness.  
 
Based on agency theory, several studies show that the effectiveness of board can be a device 
to improve investors’ perception of the reliability, the precision, and the credibility of 
information published by firms. Beasley (1996) investigates the association between board 
composition and financial statement fraud among a sample of 75 "fraud firms" and 75 "no-
fraud firms" matched by stock exchange, size, industry, and time period. The author finds that 
the likelihood of financial statement fraud is inversely related to the fraction of outside 
directors serving on the board. Dechow et al. (1996) find that firms with a large percentage of 
non-executive members are less likely to be subject to accounting enforcement actions by the 
SEC for alleged GAAP violations. Peasnell et al. (2000) provide UK evidence of less income-
increasing earnings management to achieve target earnings by firms whose boards comprise a 
higher proportion of outside directors. In a similar vein, Klein (2002) examines the role of the 
board of directors in mitigating opportunistic earnings management by US firms. She finds 
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negative relations between board independence and abnormal accruals. This finding implies 
that financial statement information is likely to be informative for firms that use more outside 
directors to supervise managers’ actions. Bushman et al. (2004) examine the linkage between 
corporate governance mechanisms and earnings timeliness and report that timeliness (a 
characteristic of decision usefulness) improves with the use of outside directors on the board. 
In terms of earnings informativeness, Vafeas (2000, 2005) argues that the corporate boards 
which are dominated by insiders are expected to compromise the quality of financial 
reporting. In contrast, a higher number of outside members on the board increases the 
likelihood that the quality of financial information will be monitored more effectively and that 
this will be reflected in higher informativeness of earnings, as measured by the relation 
between share returns and accounting earnings. 
 
Furthermore, according to the agency theory, small corporate boards are more effective 
monitors than large boards because they have a high degree of membership coordination, less 
communication difficulties and a lower incidence of severe free-rider problems. Using a 
sample of 452 US firms, Yermack (1996) shows that companies with smaller boards have 
high market values. Similarly, Eisenberg et al. (1998), based on 870 Finnish firms, find that 
larger boards are associated with a lower market value. With regard to earnings 
informativeness and board size, Vafeas (2000) provides evidence that the returns-earnings 
relation is greater for the firms with smaller board size. More recently, Ahmed et al. (2006), 
based on 604 NZ firms, find that earnings informativeness, as measured by returns-earnings 
relation, is negatively related to board size. 
 
Moreover, the separation of CEO and chairman positions increases the board’s potential 
strength and power to control opportunism (Jensen and Meckling, 1976; Eisenhardt, 1989; 
Fama and Jensen, 1983). Separation of the two positions is also an indication that boards can 
provide more objective evaluation of the firm and thus improve boards’ advice quality. 
Furthermore, Hung (1998) reports that having an outsider chairing the board increases the 
board’s legitimacy and eventually impacts the firm’s overall level of legitimacy. Dechow et 
al. (1996) provide evidence that firms whose CEO chairs the board of directors are more 
likely to be subject to accounting enforcement actions by the SEC for alleged violations of 
GAAP, while Park (1999) shows a positive link with the existence of litigation against the 
auditor.  Maury (2006) suggests that board structure significantly affects the disciplining of 
the CEO. Specifically, the findings show that the separating of CEO and Chairman role is 
associated with higher CEO turnover following low stock price performance. The results on 
board structure are consistent with the argument that increased independence in the board 
structure increases the disciplining of poorly performing CEOs.  
 
Finally, the reports (Viénot, 1995, 1999) indicate that the role of audit committee flows 
directly from the board oversight function. A key element of board oversight includes 
ensuring that quality accounting policies are in place to promote accurate, high quality and 
timely financial disclosure to the shareholders.  
For this reason, the existence of an audit committee at the time of IPO is expected to increase 
investor confidence about the quality of current financial information. Indeed, Wild (1994) 
finds that the earnings of US firms which created an AC between 1966 and 1980 are 
significantly more informative to financial market participants after creation of the AC than 
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before. This finding is consistent with the notion that the presence of an AC improves the 
shareholders' perception of earnings quality. Yee (2006) shows that poor earnings quality 
increases the firm's fundamental risk for investors, which prompts them to require a higher 
risk premium for investing in the firm. Beatty and Ritter (1986) show that there is a positive 
relationship between ex ante uncertainty and underpricing. Thus, if the existence of an AC 
increases the earnings and financial disclosure quality, it should reduce the ex ante uncertainty 
about firm value and thus reduce the level of underpricing required by potential investors.  
 
Based on the arguments and empirical findings of prior research, the choice of an 
appropriately structured board should inform the potential investors that the objective of the 
maximization of firm value is well respected, that the firm will be managed in accordance 
with their interests after the introduction to capital market. Consequently, the uncertainty 
regarding the firm’s future value is reduced.  
If the presence of an appropriately structured board gives a better guarantee to the potential 
investors, this effect may be voluntarily used by the entrepreneurs who like getting his firm to 
public. The entrepreneurs of a high-quality firm should convey credibly their favorable 
private information about the actual firm situation and its development perspective to 
potential investors. The choice of an appropriately structured (high-quality) board of directors 
is then considered as a part of signaling mechanisms. The entrepreneurs are motivated to 
choose the level of the board of directors' quality corresponding to the nature of the private 
information they hold. Through the clear identification of the board of directors' structure, 
potential investors can better rely on the information, contained in the prospectus, on the 
assets, historical profitability, economic prospects, and investment plans. The investors are 
then capable of inferring that an entrepreneur who chooses a high-quality board must have 
favorable information concerning the quality of the issue.  
According to the signaling theory, to be credible, the signal must be observable and known in 
advance and must be costly to imitate (Spence, 1973).  
The characteristics of the board of directors of a firm are an observable and easy-to-notice 
piece of information from an IPO prospectus. The IPO prospectus provides detail about a 
company's board size, its composition and its leadership structure and so has the potential to 
capture investors' attention at the time of the IPO event. Prospectuses are widely used by 
potential investors and their reference groups (e.g., analysts) to estimate the likely value of the 
firm (Firth et al., 1998). Additionally, the choice of an effective board could not be imitated 
by an entrepreneur holding unfavorable information. This one would indeed run an important 
risk as an efficient board could detect and reveal the real situation of the IPO firm more 
easily. 
Having identified the characteristics of a credible signal, how can a firm determine whether it 
has been successful in signaling board of directors from an IPO event? To date, most of these 
studies examine the effect of signaling mechanisms on the first day of initial returns (i.e., 
under pricing) as an indicator of whether or not the signal has reduced information asymmetry 
between potential investors and entrepreneurs (Megginson and Weiss, 1991; Carter et al., 
1998). These studies justify the first day returns based upon market efficiency theory, which 
suggests that the market responds immediately to information.  
In this study, following the previous studies, I propose that the credible communication of 
board of directors will result in a very small gap between the offer price and the closing price 
on the first day of trading and, therefore, very little under pricing. 
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If the choice of the board attributes advocated by the agency theory is considered as a part of 
signaling mechanisms, I expect the variables over which the choice of board structure are 
made to affect under pricing in a manner similar to that of other signaling variables. I 
therefore propose the following hypothesis: 
H1: Board size is positively associated with under pricing.  
H2: Board independence is negatively associated with under pricing. 
H3: The separate board leadership structure is negatively associated with under pricing.  
H4: The existence of an audit committee at the time of the IPO is negatively associated with 
underpricing.  
3. RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY 
As mentioned above, the aim of this study is to investigative the role of board attributes in 
signaling the quality of firms undertaking initial public offerings in France. More specifically, 
I examine the impact of board attributes on underpricing in France. The board characteristics 
examined are board size, board composition, board leadership structure, and audit committee 
existence.  
This chapter outlines the research design and methodology employed in this study to test the 
research hypotheses developed in the previous chapter. First, I present the sample of firms as 
well as the data collection method used in this study. Second, I discuss the variables and their 
respective measures. Finally, I describe the research model. 
3.1. Sample and data collect method 
The sample of firms for this study includes firms that went public from January 2000 to 
December 2004 and were traded on Euronext Paris. The firms are identified from the annual 
reports published by the "Commission des Opérations de Bourse" and the "Autorités des 
Marchés Financiers". During this period, 292 firms made initial public offerings. Out of those 
292 IPOs, I exclude 112 IPOs because of the lack of accessible information, mergers and 
acquisitions (9). Eight firms that transferred from a market to another, and sixteen firms that 
previously traded on a foreign stock market are excluded. I drop 14 financial services firms 
because their corporate governance attributes and regulation are different from those of other 
IPO firms. 
Finally, I exclude from our sample aberrant observations which are likely to bias the results of 
the multivariate analysis. To do that, I use two criteria to identify these aberrant observations 
which are: the deleted residue and the cook distance. The computation of these two criteria for 
all firms in our sample leads to eliminate 3 firms from the study.  
Then, the data set for this study is composed of 130 firms. The following Table 1 describes 
the procedure for sample constitution.   
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Table 1: Procedure for sample constitution 
Sample Number 
of firms  
Initial public offerings on Euronext Paris during 2000-2004 period (139 in 2000; 
65 in 2001; 34 in 2002; 17 in 2003; 37 in 2004)   
 292 
Firms excluded because of the lack of accessible information (prospectus 
missing, information missing) 
112 
Mergers and acquisitions 9 
Foreign firms  16 
Firms belonging to financial industry 14 
Transfers   8 
Aberrant observations 3 
Finale sample  130 
All information about corporate governance as well as the characteristics of the issuers are 
hand-collected from the IPO prospectuses which are collected from either the Authority of 
Financial Market (AMF)’s web site or the firm’s web site itself. Market prices were collected 
from Yahoo Finance database.  
3.2. Research Model 
Our major research question is to identify whether board attributes serve as a signal of firm 
quality in France. In other words, whether board attributes significantly explain the level of 
underpricing of French IPOs. A range of hypotheses relative to board of directors are tested in 
this study. To do that, regression analysis are used to model the relationship between 
underpricing and a selection of board of directors and control variables. Underpricing is 
regressed on the board attributes, the factors which are likely to influence the securities 
pricing process (auditor quality, ownership retained, underwriter reputation) as well as factors 
which are considered as proxy for ex ante uncertainty (firm size, firm age, financial leverage, 
offer size).    
According to the evidence and explanations provided above, the model of this study is 
displayed as follows: 
UNDPRIC = β0 + β1BSIZE + β2INDEAD + β3DUALITY + β4AC + β5AUDITQ + 
β6RETEN + β7AGE + β8FSIZE + β9OSIZE + β10UNDWR + β11LEV + β12MARK + ε (1) 
Where  
- UNDPRIC represents the level of underpricing. It equals to (P1 – P0)/ P1  
where P1: closing price on first day of trading  
           P0: offering price  
- BSIZE is the number of directors on the board of directors. 
- INDEAD is the proportion of independent directors on the board.  
- DUALITY: Categorical variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 
otherwise. 
- AC: Categorical variable that equals to 1 if the firm has an audit committee at the time of the 
IPO and 0 otherwise. 
- RETENT: Proportion of shares retained by the founders, the managers, and their families 
after IPO. 
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- AUDITQ: Categorical variable that equals to 1 if one of the auditors at the time of the IPO is 
one of a Big 5 firm (highest quality), and 0 otherwise. 
- UNDWR: Categorical variable that equals to 1 if the underwriter is one of the following 
banks: CREDIT LYONNAIS, CERDIT AGRICOLE, BNP, BANQUE POPULAIRE, and 0 
otherwise.  
- AGE: Number of years from the foundation to the IPO.  
- FSIZE: Firm size, was measured by the natural log of pre-IPO total assets. 
- LEV: book value of total debts divided by book value of total assets. 
- OSIZE: The natural log of gross proceeds from the IPO. 
- MARK: Categorical variable which equals 1 if the firm initially lists on the "Marché Libre", 
2 if the firm initially lists on the "Nouveau Marché", 3 if the firm initially lists on the "Second 
Marché", 4 if the firm initially lists on the "Premier Marché".   
- βi: represents the regression coefficients. 
- ε: is a standard error term of an OLS regression.   
The empirical model is estimated using Ordinary Least Square (OLS).  
4. EMPIRICAL RESULTS AND DISCUSSION   
4.1. Descriptive statistics 
The following Table 2 reports the descriptive statistics of the endogenous variable level of 
underpricing. Our results confirm the existence of the underpricing phenomenon on Euronext 
Paris between 2000 and 2004. Indeed, I observe a level of average underpricing of 12.02 % 
on the first day of listing.      
 
 
Variable  UNDPRIC 
N 130 
Mean  .1201623 
Median  .1103 
Standard deviation  .0945336 
 
The level of underpricing of firms in our sample appears to be slightly lower than that noticed 
in previous French studies. Indeed, Ginglinger and Faugeron-Crouzet (2002) establish an 
average underpricing of 18 % on 292 observations between 1983 and 1994. Broye and Schatt 
(2003) find an average level of underpricing of 20.3% on a sample of 402 admissions between 
1986 and 2000. This finding may be explained by the differences in sampling particularly by 
taking into account in our sample recent years of listing (2000-2004). In fact, using 185 
French firms undertaking IPO between 1994 and 2000, Labégorre and Boubakri (2005) notice 
that, an average, these IPO firms are underpriced by about 14.7 %. The authors show that the 
level of underpricing increases over the period 1994-1996 and deceases afterwards (1997-
2000) to reach low levels of underpricing.  
 
 
Tableau 2: Descriptive Statistics for Underpricing      
 10 
4.2. Multivariate analysis 
In our study, to verify the absence of multicolinearity between these variables, I use the 
matrix of Pearson correlations. To assess the absence of multicolinearity between the 
explanatory variables, Kennedy (1985) suggests that the coefficients of correlation must be 
lower than 0.8. 
From the results reported in the Table 3, I notice that all the coefficients of correlation present 
values lower than 0.8. Therefore, I can draw the conclusion that the problem of 
multicolinearity between the continuous explanatory variables does not exist. 
To verify whether the disturbance terms are homoscedastic, I perform the test of White 
(1980). It consists in regressing the squared residuals on all distinct regressors, the squared 
values and the cross products of regressors. The test statistic, a Lagrange multiplier measure is 
distributed chi-squared (p) under the null hypothesis of homoscedasticity. If p-value of the 
assumption of the coefficients are equal to 0 is superior to 10 %, I can not reject the null 
hypothesis and confirm that the coefficients are different from 0. So, I can say that the 
residuals have the character of homoscedasticity.  
In our case, the results show that residuals are homoscedastic. Indeed, the statistics of chi-
square presents a value of 77.3928 with a level of significance of .5301.    
Then, the results of the specification tests show that the adoption of the method of Ordinary 
Least Square (OLS) seems to be adequate. I, in what follows, use this method in the analysis 
of the regression. 
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*     The correlation is significant at the 0.1 level. 
**   The correlation is significant at the 0.05 level.  
*** The correlation is significant at the 0.01 level. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 BSIZE INDEAD DUALITY RETENT AGE FSIZE AUDITQ UNDWR LEV MARK AC OSIZE 
BSIZE 1.000            
INDEAD ,358*** 1.000           
DUALITY -,043 -,347*** 1.000          
RETENT -,394** -,426*** ,127 1.000         
AGE ,057 -,071 -,012 ,049 1.000        
FSIZE ,377*** ,094 -,177** -,271*** ,260*** 1.000       
AUDITQ ,330*** ,267*** -,049 -,531*** -,079 ,364*** 1.000      
UNDWR ,197** ,028 -,053 -,251*** -,178** ,260*** ,356*** 1.000     
LEV -,119 -,051 -,091 ,147* -,089 -,156* -,127 -,049 1.000    
MARK ,078 ,047 ,092 -,195** ,109 ,268*** ,380*** ,278*** -
,180** 
1.000   
AC ,302*** ,229*** -,380*** -,272*** ,136 ,486*** ,269*** ,068 -,042 -,173** 1.000  
OSIZE ,370*** ,311*** -,183** -,585*** ,150* ,609*** ,677*** ,415*** -,172* ,498*** ,467*** 1.000 
Table 3: Matrix of Pearson correlation  
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The Table 4 provides the results of multivariate regression relied on to test the hypothesized 
relationship. Underpricing is regressed on the board attributes as well as control variables. 
The explanatory power of all the tested regressions is considered as acceptable given that the 
adjusted R-square seems to be satisfactory (the adjusted R-square for the regression is 
0.2083). Furthermore, the statistics of Fisher (F) is significant at the level of 1 %. Therefore, 
the global significance of the tested models is proved.  
 
 
Dependent variable: UNDPRIC Independent 
variables  Expected signs Coef. t P>|t| 
BSIZE (+) .0100553 2.15 0.033 
INDEAD (-) -.0559568 -1.68 0.096 
DUALITY (+) -.0016169 -0.06 0.952 
AC (-) .008513 0.16 0.870 
AUDITQ (-) .0349062 1.59 0.114 
RETENT (-) .000198 0.50 0.617 
AGE (-) .0012288 1.60 0.113 
FSIZE (-) -.0006788 -0.06 0.956 
UNDWR (-) .0232729 1.08 0.281 
LEV ? .0437248 1.77 0.079 
MARK ? .0084715 0.61 0.540 
OSIZE (-) .0247728 1.34 0.181 
_CONS  -.1562912 -1.24 0.217 
N = 130; F =  3.83; P = 0.0001; R-squared = 0.2820; Adj R-squared = 0.2083  
- UNDPRIC: represents the level of underpricing. It equals to (P1 – P0)/ P1    
- BSIZE: The total number of directors on the board  
- INDEAD: The proportion of independent directors on the board 
- DUALITY: Categorical variable that equals 1 if the CEO is also the chairman and 0 
otherwise 
- AUDITQ: Categorical variable that equals to 1 if one of the auditors at the time of the IPO 
is one of a Big 5 firm, and 0 otherwise. 
- RETENT: Percentage of ownership retained by the founders, the managers, and their 
families after IPO   
- AGE: Number of years from the foundation to the IPO 
- FSIZE: The natural log of pre-IPO total assets 
- UNDWR: Categorical variable that equals to 1 if the underwriter at the time of the IPO is 
one of the following banks: CREDIT LYONNAIS, CERDIT AGRICOLE, BNP, BANQUE 
POPULAIRE, and 0 otherwise. 
- LEV: Book value of total divided by book value of total assets. 
- MARK: Categorical variable which equals 1 if the firm initially lists on the "Marché 
Libre", 2 if the firm initially lists on the "Nouveau Marché", 3 if the firm initially lists on the 
"Second Marché", 4 if the firm initially lists on the "Premier Marché". 
- AC: Categorical variable that equals to 1 if the firm has an audit committee at the time of 
the IPO and 0 otherwise. 
- OSIZE: The natural log of gross proceeds 
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As expected, the OLS results reported in the Table 4 show that the coefficient on board size 
(BSIZE) is positive (.0100553) and significant (p < .05). Thus board size has a positive and 
significant effect on the level of underpricing. This supports our hypothesis that IPO firms 
with smaller board experience lower level of underpricing. The hypothesis 1 is then 
supported. Thus, the choice of smaller board can reduce investors' ex ante uncertainty with 
regard to firm value, and positively affects the pricing of the issue.  
To examine whether the relationship between board size and underpricing is non-linear, I add 
a board size squared variable to the model (1). I notice that the coefficient for this variable is 
not significant1. The lack of significance leads to the conclusion that there is no non-linear 
relationship between board size and underpricing.    
The results of the Table 4 show that the proportion of independent directors is negatively and 
significantly associated with underpricing. More specifically and as expected, the coefficient 
on INDEAD is negative and significant (β2 = -.0559568, p<0.1). The hypothesis 2 is then 
supported. This suggests that IPO firms with higher proportion of independent directors 
experience lower level of underpricing. Therefore, the choice of independent board members 
facilitates the reduction of investors' ex ante uncertainty at the time of IPO and positively 
affects the pricing of the issue.  
Contrary to our expectations, CEO duality seems, according to the table 4, that it has no 
significant impact on IPO underpricing in France.  The lack of significance leads to the 
conclusion that the hypothesis 3 is not supported. Thus, the leadership structure does not 
reduce investors' ex ante uncertainty at the time of IPO in France. A possible explanation for 
the insignificant relationship between board leadership structure and underpricing may 
involve our firm sample. In fact, at 88.5 percent of IPO French firms, in our sample, the CEO 
is also the chairman of the board. With such little variance in this exogenous variable, then, an 
insignificant relationship is not surprising.    
Similarly, the variable existence of an audit committee at the time of IPO has no significant 
impact on underpricing of French IPOs (p = 0.870). Thus, the hypothesis H4 is not supported. 
In fact, I expect that the creation of an audit committee at the time of IPO is crucial and I 
suggest a negative relationship between existence of an audit committee and underpricing. 
This result is consistent with the notion that it is not the mere existence of an audit committee 
that reduces investors' ex-ante uncertainty, but its quality that matters.  Another possible 
explanation for the insignificant relationship between existence of audit committee and 
underpricing may involve our firm sample. Indeed, only 4.6 percent of the firms in our sample 
have an audit committee at the time of IPO. With such little variance in this exogenous 
variable, then, an insignificant relationship is not surprising.  
Regarding the control variables, from the table, the coefficient on the variable LEV is positive 
and significant. This suggests that firms with high leverage are associated with higher level of 
underpricing. In theory, a higher financial leverage ratio makes earnings more volatile and 
increases the probability that a firm will be unable to meet the required interest payments and 
will default on the debt. Therefore, a higher proportion of financial leverage ratio indicates 
greater financial risk, thereby increasing underpricing. 
To examine whether the relationship between financial leverage and underpricing is non-
linear, I add a financial leverage squared variable to the model (1)2. I notice that the 
                                                 
1
 The results are not reported here 
2
 The results are not reported here 
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coefficient for this variable is not significant. Thus, a non-linear relationship between 
financial leverage and underpricing is not apparent.   
The results of the Table 4 show that the offer size has no impact on the underpricing of 
French IPOs. In fact, contrary to our expectation, the coefficient on the variable OSIZE is 
positive but not significant. These finding are not consistent with previous empirical studies. 
Ritter (1984) and Levis (1993) find a negative and significant relationship between the offer 
size and underpricing. I can explain the positive relationship between offer size and 
underpricing by the imbalance between the supply and demand of securities in France. It can 
be assumed that, all other things being equal, for a large size offering, it is hard to find 
investors willing to acquire securities and the offer will push down the first day price of the 
securities.  
From the Table 4, I notice that ownership retained has no significant effect on the level of 
underpricing. In fact, the coefficient inherent to the variable RETENT is positive (.000198) 
and not significant (0.617). Our finding is inconsistent with the signal theory. Indeed, as 
discussed previously, the signaling theory suggests that higher percentages of ownership 
retained by insiders serve as a signal to potential investors and correlates negatively with 
underpricing (Leland and Pyle, 1977; Downes and Heinkel, 1982). Our result, however, is 
consistent with several empirical studies. Lee et al. (1993) show, on a sample of 266 
Australian firms introduced between 1976 and 1989, that the shares retained by the manager 
increase significantly the level of underpricing. Using 394 French IPOs between 1983 and 
1998, Broye (2001) finds a significant and positive relationship between equity retained by 
the CEO and the level of underpricing. In the same way, Labégorre and Boubakri (2005) 
demonstrate the same link on a sample of 185 offerings of common stock on the French 
market between 1984 and 2000.  
To our knowledge, few authors have obtained a negative and significant relationship between 
underpricing and ownership retained by insiders. Beatty (1989) demonstrates this link using a 
sample of 2215 US IPOs between 1975 and 1984. Moreover, Firth and Smith (1992) show 
that ownership retained by insiders determines negatively but not significantly the level of 
underpricing for 89 New Zealand firms.  
The positive relationship between ownership retained by insiders and underpricing found in 
this study is consistent with the stream of research suggesting that some investors might 
interpret higher proportion of shares retained by insiders as a signal of potential managerial 
entrenchment.      
A possible explanation for the insignificant finding may involve lock-up periods. In fact, 
although some insiders retain higher proportion of shares at the time of the IPO, they may sell 
their equity stakes just after the IPO. In that sense, Courteau (1995) shows that the length of 
the lock-up period can be considered as a signaling mechanism that complements ownership 
retention. As such, it may be that investors are becoming interested in the both ownership 
retention and the length of the lock-up period and not in ownership retention alone.    
To examine whether the relationship between ownership retained and underpricing is non-
linear, I add an ownership retained squared variable to the model (1)3. I notice that the 
coefficient for this variable is not significant. Thus, a non-linear relationship between 
ownership retained and underpricing is not evident.  
                                                 
3
 The results are not reported here 
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In respect of the relationship between auditor quality and underpricing of French IPOs, the 
Table 4 shows that there is no significant relationship between these two variables. 
Furthermore, I notice that the coefficient on AUDITQ is positive. This finding is contrary to 
the signaling assumptions advanced by Titman and Trueman (1986) and Beatty (1989). In 
their model, these authors consider the reputation of the auditor as an effective signal of IPO 
firm value and suggest a negative relationship between auditor quality and underpricing. 
Beatty (1989) and Balvers et al. (1988) validate this relationship using US IPO firms; 
Clarkson et al. (1992) validate it using Canadian IPO firms.  
In addition, previous empirical studies using French IPO firms provide mixed evidence on the 
impact of auditor quality on underpricing: in the works of Labégorre and Boubaker (2005), 
auditor quality does not reduce significantly IPO underpricing. Nevertheless, this link is 
identified in the study of Broye (2001).  
Similarly, the coefficient on the variable UNDWR is positive but not significant (p = 0.281). 
This suggests that underwriter reputation has no significant influence on underpricing. 
However, the positive sign of the coefficient on this variable implies that more prestigious 
underwriters are associated with higher level of underpricing. This is opposite to the signaling 
theory (Carter and Manaster, 1990; Carter et al., 1998). According to these authors, the 
prestigious banks, to preserve their reputation, only underwrite low risk and easily assessable 
IPO firms with the available information. The underwriter reputation reduces, in this context, 
the ex ante uncertainty about the value of the IPO firms and therefore mitigates the level of 
underpricing. However, there is a lack of conclusive empirical evidence concerning the 
relationship between these two variables. In fact, this link has been clearly established in the 
US market by Beatty and Ritter (1986). In addition, Michaely and Shaw (1994) report that the 
US IPOs underwritten by more prestigious underwriters exhibit a lower level of underpricing 
than do IPOs handled by less prestigious underwriters. However, using Japanese IPOs, 
Beckman et al. (2001) find that underwriter reputation is not related to underpricing.     
On the other hand, French IPO studies give also mixed results on the impact of underwriter 
reputation on underpricing: in the study of Labégorre and Boubaker (2005), the reputation of 
the underwriter has a negative and significant impact on underpricing. In the study of Broye 
(1998), the presence of a reputable underwriter does not seem to have an incidence on the 
valuation of the IPO firm by the financial market.  
Our result (positive link between underwriter reputation and underpricing) is, as for it, in 
compliance with the predictions of Loughran and Ritter (2002 and 2004) in an agency 
context. According to these authors, prestigious underwriters benefit from their reputation to 
maximize their fees through higher level of underpricing at IPO.    
Turning to the firm age, this variable has a positive and not significant influence on the level 
of underpricing. So, contrary to our expectation, old firms are associated with more level of 
underpricing. This is inconsistent with the results obtained by Chemmanur and Fulghieri 
(1999), Broye (2001) and Broye and Schatt (2003). 
In respect of the relationship between firm size and underpricing of French IPOs, there is no 
significant connection found in this study. This can be explained by the homogeneity of the 
size of the firms of the sample.  
 
 
 
 16 
4.3. Robustness tests 
In the regressions of the Table 4, the underpricing and board characteristics are supposed 
exogenous. Yet, the level of underpricing depends, among others, on the offer price which, in 
addition to the board structure, are chosen by the manager. Then, it becomes important to 
control for the possible endogeneity between the level of underpricing and board 
characteristics.  
As suggested by Davidson and McKinnon (1993), the general approach used to test for 
endogeneity is the Durbin-Wu-Hausman (DWH) test. Applied to our case, the Durbin-Wu-
Hausman test does not reject the null hypothesis of no endogeneity. I conclude that OLS lead 
to unbiased and consistent estimates in our sample.          
5. CONCLUSION 
The initial public offerings are characterized by situations of uncertainty and information 
asymmetry which lead to underpricing of the securities offered. It is in the interest of the 
managers of high quality firms to convey their favorable information to obtain a better 
valuation of firm shares. They can, for this purpose, use credible signaling mechanisms that 
allow potential investors to estimate the quality of the issue. 
Prior empirical evidence suggests that board size, board independence, separation of CEO and 
chairman functions, and existence of audit committee are significantly related to board 
quality. In addition, the existing empirical evidence indicates that board quality has a positive 
association with financial reporting and disclosure quality, and earnings and disclosures of 
listed firms with higher quality board are perceived as being more informative and relevant by 
financial markets (investors perceive earnings and disclosures of listed firms to be more 
informative and relevant (to be of higher quality) when the board is of high quality). I 
examine whether board of directors can serve as a signal of firm quality and reduce ex ante 
uncertainty about the value of firm's equity. In other words, our research question is does 
board quality matter in firm pricing. I use the context of French Initial Public offering to 
investigate this possibility. I find some supporting results. In fact, our results show that the 
choice of a properly structured board at the time of IPO has a favorable incidence on IPO 
underpricing. Specifically, I find that board size has a positive and significant impact on the 
level of underpring and board independence has a negative and significant effect on the 
magnitude of underpricing. However, the association of CEO and chairman position and 
existence of audit committee have no effect on IPO underpricing. Thus, the choice of a high 
quality board conveys a positive signal and information about the issuer quality to potential 
investors, which reduces ex ante uncertainty and thus limits shares discount.  
Our finding extends the literature on board quality and on IPOs. In light of the wealth of 
research on board quality of listed firms, I extend the literature to firms undertaking IPO. I 
view board of directors as a signal that existing financial reporting and disclosures of the firm 
pass the due diligence tests by an effective board and thus are of high quality and. Our results 
are consistent with our hypothesis and I suggest that the advantages associated with high 
quality board, i.e., smaller board and higher percentage of independent directors will 
positively signal the credibility of earnings and financial disclosure contained in the 
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prospectus and reported for potential investors, thereby reducing information asymmetry and 
mitigating the level of underpricing.    
The evidence concerning the fact that board quality matters for securities pricing, presented in 
this study has two major consequences. The first one is that the board quality may be used by 
potential investors to assess the true value of the securities and the uncertainty associated with 
the issue. The second one is, all things being equal; it seems interesting for a high quality to 
choose an effective board at the time of IPO. Thus, the choice of board structure represents an 
important strategic decision of the managers. 
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